CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 274

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

1.

BRUNEI FUTURE POLICY

(Previous Reference: OPD (67) 28th Meeting, Item 7)

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, referring to his minute to the

Prime Minister of 21st September, recalled that at their meeting on 28th July the Committee had invited his predecessor, after consultation with the Attorney-General, to advise the Sultan of Brunei formally to take certain steps to democratise the constitution of Brunei and, in addition,

to give the Sultan in the near future formal notice of two years for the termination of the 1959 Anglo-Brunei Agreement. It was a greed that he

should consider, in consultation with the Attorney-General, the manner in

which such notice should be given and its precise timing in the light of

the formal advice to be given to the Sultan.

The Law Officers had advised that we should be justified in with-

drawing from our obligations under the Agreement so long as we acted

reasonably, and that two years' notice of the termination was the least that could reasonably be given; in their view it was not necessary to

rest on the likely failure of the Sultan to accept formal advice to promote constitutional progress in order to have legitimate grounds for terminating the Agreement. Nevertheless, he felt that there were serious objections to giving notice of termination of the Agreement in the very

near future to take effect in 1969 on the anniversary of its signature,

29th September. When his predecessor talked with the Sultan in June and

July, he gave no hint that we intended to give notice of termination in

the next few months, and if we did so on 29th September this year the

Sultan could accuse us of breach of faith. The Sultan tended to act

irrationally, and might well retaliate against us, by withdrawing

Brunei's sterling reserves of about £115 million, or by refusing further oil concessions to the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company. It would there-

fore be to our advantage to defer notice of termination for some months.

We should consider the implications of giving formal advice on

constitutional reforms to the Sultan, as distinct from continuing to

maintain the strong informal advice we had previously given. The

offering of formal advice would imply that we were ready to maintain the

Anglo-Brunei Agreement if the advice were followed. If the Sultan

refused our advice, we should have to abrogate the Agreement shortly thereafter at a time which might not be to our advantage; or he might adopt delaying tactics and this would place us in an equally unsatisfactory position. It was important to avoid creating a situation of instability in Brunei which would increase the difficulties of our disengagement.

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